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THE IMPACT ON BUSINESS OF ANTITRUST DECREES
PHILIP MARCUS*

Government regulation of business may not be widespread but it is
not unknown in this country. The source of such regulation normally,
however, is a federal or state statute. Sometimes, as in the case of the
Fair Trade Laws, businessmen have even promoted such regulation.
Less well known, but often far-reaching, is the regulation of business
conduct through antitrust judgments. Needless to say, generally such
judgments are not welcomed by those to whom they apply.
About five hundred civil antitrust judgments have been entered in
cases brought by the United States under the antitrust laws.' Cease
and desist orders of the Federal Trade Commission, founded upon
violation of the antitrust laws, have also been considerable in number.2
Of the one hundred largest corporations in this country, few have
escaped antitrust prosecution. This has been so, not because of their
size, but because of misuse of power which they have possessed or
because they have been parties to a price fixing agreement. Many,
through the process of litigation or the medium of consent decree
negotiations, have had an antitrust judgment entered against them.
Hundreds of other corporations and many a trade association have
found themselves in a similar situation.
The number of commodities, lines of commerce, or industries affected by such judgments has been very large, as have been the kinds of
3
business activities reached.
The judgment in a government antitrust suit is not a judgment for
damages.4 It is an equity decree, injunctive in nature. The cease and
desist order of the Federal Trade Commission is also injunctive in
form. 5 And even in private antitrust cases, although by far the usual
* Member. New York Bar. The opinions expressed in this article are the
writer's and not necessarily those of any government agency.
1. About 360 of these have been consent judgments. For changes in business practices resulting from a successful criminal antitrust suit, see Stelzer,
Economic Consequences of A Successful Antitrust Prosecution, A Note on
The South-Eastern Underwriters Case, 373 INs. L.J. 86 (1954).
2. This article is primarily concerned with business operations under antitrust judgments.

3. See Marcus, Patents, Antitrust Law and Antitrust Judgments Through
Hartford-Empire, 34 GEO. L.J. 1, 36-54 (1945); Note, Standards Governing

Relief Under Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 97 U. oF PA. L. REV. 234 (1948).
4. Not until 1955 did Congress provide that the Federal Government could
recover antitrust damages for injury to it in its proprietary capacity. 69 STAT.
282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (Supp. IV, 1957). As of the time of this writing,
no action has been brought under this statute.
5. For the most part such orders, founded upon antitrust violations, contain
prohibitions few in number, but some are more elaborate. See, e.g., In Matter
of Mink Traders Ass'n, 49 F.T.C. 160, 180 (1952).
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relief requested is that of damages, equity relief is permissible; in a
6
few instances, such relief granted has been quite broad in nature.
In the early period of enforcement of the antitrust laws, when a
suit was brought against a number of defendants it was rare to find
a judgment which applied to one defendant acting alone. For many
years, however, not infrequently judgments have been made applicable to each defendant when acting alone, even though the complaint was couched in terms of concerted action. 7 This will occur
where the judgment would have little or no practical effect without
such provisions.
Antitrust judgments commonly apply in express terms to "successors" of the defendants named in the judgment. It is still not clear
whether the inclusion of the term makes the judgment more binding
upon successors than if the judgment did not so provide.8 But its
presence is certainly an indication that the judgment was not intended
to have a transitory effect.
For the most part such judgments are without time limits, although
occasionally fixed time limits are attached to particular provisions in
a judgment. Amendments to judgments are not frequent. Two notable
exceptions, however, will be discussed at some length in this article.
Generally, an antitrust judgment will proscribe certain conduct, but
it may also require continuing affirmative action. It may merely prohibit price fixing; it may require dissolution, divorcement, or divestiture which, in turn, may require financial conduct quite different from
that with which the defendants were accustomed. And, not infrequently, a complex code of business conduct is prescribed. 9
It is significant that the most comprehensive antitrust decrees are
likely to be found to be directed against the leaders of an industry.
This means that although the rules of the game may vary from
member to member, in terms of percentage of the business done the
greater part of that industry will operate under a government-pre6. E.g., William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir.
1948); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 162 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 817 (1947); Ball v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 81 F. Supp.
212 (W.D. Pa. 1948), modified and affld, 176 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1949).
7. For approval of an order of the Federal Trade Commission of this sort,
see FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957). In antitrust judgments,
the language used to achieve this result varies. One clause often used, however, is "jointly and severally"; another is "and each of them."
8. See Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 809, 817-18
(N.D. Ill. 1956). In United States v. Mosaic Tile Co., 3 D. & J. 2128, 2131, 194043 Trade Cas. ff 56051, (N.D. Ill. 1940), the judgment went to unusual lengths
in attempting to make it applicable to "any and all corporations, partnerships,
associations, and individuals who may acquire the ownership, control, directly or indirectly, of the property, business and assets of the defendants or
any of them. . . ." Some judgments condition transfers of assets upon the
transferee filing its consent, in court, to be bound by the judgment.
9. See, e.g., United States v. American Can Co., 1950-51 Trade Cas. 1 62679
(N.D. Cal. 1950).
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scribed set of rules.'0 In all probability, some of the other members of
the industry, either from an abundance of caution or because they
think it advisable to follow the practices of the leaders of their industry, will conform to such rules, although not bound by them. Thus,
some of the small motion picture companies which were not defendants in the Paramountcase" conformed their practices in licensing
feature films to accord with conduct of the defendants called for by
judgments against the latter.
It is the misuse of power, or at least a belief in its misuse, that almost always furnishes the basis for a comprehensive antitrust decree.
And, since the courts have held that legal activity may be condemned
if part of an illegally held power or a broader illegal conduct, it is
not surprising to find that many antitrust judgments prohibit or
regulate trade practices which, by themselves, would not be within
the ambit of the antitrust laws. Also, once interstate commerce has
been assumed or proved sufficient to support the cause of action, only
in a very unusual situation is the judgment confined to interstate
12
transactions.
Even though a concern is not a party to an antitrust judgment, a
judgment may be framed against a defendant, the intended effect
of which is to restrict or regulate the business relations of that con3
cern with the defendant.
Usually a government antitrust judgment is framed so that the
government may have only minimal participation in the carrying out
of the judgment. It does not follow, however, that in practice it so
works out, although generally the government is merely a silent
policeman. Some judgments, however, by their terms envisage a
more active role on the part of the Department of Justice. 4
10. It is the judicial branch of the government which enters the judgment. But whether the judgment is consent or litigated, its final terms are
more likely to be the result of an amalgam of the views of the government
attorneys and representatives of the defendants than of any expertise of
the court.
11. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).

12. The power of the court to prevent interstate harm would seem to be
ample basis to regulate intrastate conduct. The court's jurisdiction as to relief is not limited to its jurisdiction to decide the question of violation.
13. United States v. Greyhound Corp., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1957 Trade
Cas.) f 68756 (N.D. Ill. 1957) (effect on General Motors).

14. See United States v. Gamewell Co., 4 D. & J. 3175, 1948-49 Trade Cas.
ff 62236 at 62,379 (D. Mass. 1948). [In 1918 the Department of Justice pub-

lished a volume called Decrees and Judgments in Federal Antitrust Cases,

which was distributed to some extent among law libraries. Several years ago
the Department published a four volume set entitled Decrees and Judgments
in Civil Federal Antitrust Cases. This set included all civil judgments and
decrees from 1890 to 1949. Apparently none of the sets were sold or distributed to law libraries, but some were distributed to the Library of Congress
and to certain Congressional committees, as well as to members of the Department's Antitrust Division. Both the 1918 volume and the four volume
set are referred to as "D. & J."; citations with that reference in this article
are to the four volume set.]
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Those who decry government regulation by antitrust decree may
often have the alternatives of dissolution, divorcement, or divestiture
relief. Exceedingly few are willing to accept such alternatives. And
when, for some reason, the latter relief, although proper, is not
adopted, regulatory provisions are wont to be severe and, at times,
numerous.
OBLIGATION OF PRIVATE

BusNESS TO DEAL WITH PUBLIC

In addition to other obligations, an antitrust judgment not infrequently imposes those of a public utility nature upon a defendant. Government-granted monopolies to private enterprise in the public utility
field, such as electricity and gas, carry with them a corresponding
curtailment of a power of refusal to deal. But, although our courts may
well have been mistaken in their view that the common law, with
few exceptions, allowed a businessman to refuse to deal at his will,
this still appears to be the general rule for most types of commercial
15
enterprises.
Yet, since the economic significance of a refusal to sell may be in
direct proportion to how important it is to the would-be-buyer to
have access to the seller's wares or services, it is apparent that refusals
to sell may have important competitive consequences. And, the
aphorism that it is "Daddy who pays" usually casts him in the role
of the consumer whose affection for a "price-cutter" is not shared by
the business fraternity. The problem may become more rather than
less complex when a company will sell, but only upon conditions
which extend beyond those pertaining to credit.
In one field in particular, antitrust judgments have significantly
curtailed the businessman's right to refuse to deal.
Patents and PatentLicensing Agreements
The right to exclude and its corollary right to refuse to deal are
the essence of what is granted by the government when it issues a
patent. But, perhaps because of the very scope of the power inherent
in a patent and the public welfare which it is supposed to promote,
misuse of the power has often resulted in the imposition of public
utility obligations.
Since the early forties, 16 some ninety-odd antitrust judgments have
contained provisions for compulsory licensing at reasonable royalties.
15. See Mund, Right To Buy And Its Denial To Small Business, S. Doc.

No. 32, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).

16. It was not until the late 1930's that the Department of Justice began
to institute a series of patent antitrust suits designed to elicit from the courts
a determination of whether, and to what extent, the antitrust laws applied
to conduct asserted to be without their pale because of patent privilege.
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A few have required specified patents to be dedicated to the public.' 7
And a respectable number have imposed the obligation to license without royalties.' 8 While the imposition of the last-mentioned obligation
has not received unequivocal sanction by the courts where the patent
holder has not consented, 9 it is well settled that an antitrust judgment may require the licensing not only of existing patents but also
of future patents. 20 Curtailment of the right to bring infringement
suits is also found in antitrust judgments, 2' but not as often as obligations to license. Much more exceptionable is a prohibition against the
acquisition of patents, save from limited sources. 22 Thousands of
patents have been affected by these types of antitrust judgments.
In some instances, where the patents have covered a machine, the
antitrust judgment has required the patent holder to offer the machine
for sale as well as to offer to lease it, even though prior to the judgment, the licensor had not offered the machines for sale. Such judgments seek to break the hold on an industry obtained at least in part
by restricting the status of the user to that of a licensee.23 Antitrust
patent judgments, moreover, commonly strip from patent licensing
agreements restrictions as to price, production or sale.
Antitrust judgments have also enjoined defendants from becoming
24
exclusive licensees under patents held by others.
17. E.g., United States v. A. B. Dick Co., 4 D. & J. 3121, 1948-49 Trade Cas. ff
62233 (N.D. Ohio 1948); United States v. United States Pipe and Foundry
Co., 1948-49 Trade Cas. f[ 62285 (D.N.J. 1948); United States v. HartfordEmpire Co., 3 D. & J. 1848, 1895, 1946-47 Trade Cas. ff 57571 (N.D. Ohio 1947);
United States v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 3 D. & J. 2409, 1940-43 Trade Cas.
f[ 56147 (N.D. Ill. 1941).
18. United States v. Western Electric Co., 1956 Trade Cas. ff 68246 (D.N.J.
1956); United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 1954 Trade Cas. II 67828 (D.
R.I. 1954); United States v. Technicolor, Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. fr 62586
(S.D. Cal. 1950); United States v. A. B. Dick Co., 1948-49 Trade Cas. ff 62233
(N.D. Ohio 1948); United States v. Technicolor, Inc. 4 D. & J. 2282, 1946-47
Trade Cas. ff 57448 (D.N.$. 1946) (applicable to Corning Glass Works). Among
other things, such judgments have involved color motion picture film, automotive air brakes, cast iron pressure pipe, and plastics.
19. Compare Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945),
with United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 349 (1947).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 3 D. & J. 1848, 1946-47
Trade Cas. ff 57571 (N.D. Ohio 1947).
21. United States v. Technicolor, Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. ff 62586 (S.D.
Cal. 1950); United States v. A. B. Dick Co., 4 D. & J. 3121, 1948-49 Trade Cas. U
62233 (N.D. Ohio 1948); United States v. General Electric Co., 3 D. & J. 2282,
1946-47 Trade Cas. ff 57488 (D.N.J. 1946) (Corning Glass Co.); United States
v. Vehicular Parking, 3 D. & J. 2616, 56 F. Supp. 297 (D. Del. 1944).
22. United States v. Wallace & Tiernan, 1954 Trade Cas. ff 67828 (D.R.I.
1954).
23. United States v. American Can Co., 1950-51 Trade Cas. f 62679 (N.D.
Cal. 1950). Under a licensing system, it is difficult if not impossible, for the
non-patent holder to obtain used machines. He is also often under a long
term continuing obligation to the licensor. Moreover, through the medium of
royalty provisions keyed to production or sales, the licensee may have to
divulge business information he would prefer to keep to himself.
24. E.g., United States v. Textile Machine Works, 1950-51 Trade Cas.
62709 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v. Gamewell Co., 4 D. & J. 3175, 1948-49
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Through antitrust judgments, compulsory licensing has been applied
to thousands of patents. 25 Compulsory-licensing antitrust judgments
have been entered against some two hundred corporations; in some
instances, against individuals as well.2 The roster of companies against
whom such judgments have been obtained include the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Eastman Kodak Company, General
Electric Company, International Business Machine Company, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, as well as others in wellknown industries. The significance of a judgment is not necessarily
to be determined, however, by size of the company to which it pertains since its application to a patent holding company or to a comparatively small but patent-controlling company in an industry may
change the industry pattern. The range of subjects affected by such
27
judgments has been wide-from the well-known to the obscure.
The early antitrust judgments which provided for compulsory
licensing at reasonable royalties placed the government in the position
of being the moving or resisting party under the procedure set up for
determining reasonable royalties. As the result of its experience under
the Hartford-Empirejudgment,2 the Antitrust Division recoiled from
further similar embroilment.
The pendulum swung so far that January 1947 found the Department
of Justice arguing strenuously to the Supreme Court for royaltyfree licensing on the ground of the onerous burden upon the courts "to
determine reasonable royalties." "In fact, in some antitrust suits where
large areas of American industry are controlled patent-wise the task
would seem impossible."29 And a further argument was, "that it puts
Trade Cas. II 62236 (D. Mass. 1948); United States v. A. B. Dick Co., 4 D. & J.
3121, 1948-49 Trade Cas. 62233 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
25. Since 1949, an arrangement has existed between the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice and the Patent Office whereby the latter is
apprised of judgments affecting patents; lists of patents so affected are procured from defendants and the Patent Office makes available to the public
knowledge of such patents.
26. E.g., United States v. Switzer Brothers, Inc., 1952-53 Trade Cas. ff

ir

67598 (N. D. Cal. 1953).

27. Among them have been cigar-making machinery; gear-finishing and
cutting machines; shoe-making processes; tabulating cards; tabulating machinery and systems; electronic data processing machines; communications
services and equipment; wrinkle finish enamels, paints and varnishes; metal
wheels; hydraulic oil well pumps; highway crossing gates and gate activation
machinery; processing color film and the equipment necessary therefor; metal
abrasives; peach-pitting machinery; chlorinating equipment; venetian blinds;
lamps; fluorescent lamps; natural latex and latex products; absorption refrigeration units; milling machines; tractor cabs; daylight fluorescent materials and
devices; hydraulic braking systems; electrical equipment; variable condensers;
telescope carts; shoe making machinery; dry ice; plastic artificial eyes, plain
knit elastic top hosiery and plain knit elastic top hosiery machines; chemical
products and sporting ammunition.
28. See page 313 infra.
29. Brief for Appellee (United States), p. 70, United States v. National
Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
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the courts squarely in the position of regulating competition in the
industry and of fixing the financial terms upon which new competition
can enter the industry. '30 These arguments did not persuade the
Supreme Court to give the government the relief it desired. Its forebodings, moreover, have not been realized.
Since the judgment against the American Optical Company 3' in
1948, the customary compulsory licensing provision has placed the
burden of litigating this issue upon the licensor and licensee-but the
burden of proof as to "reasonableness" has continued to be placed upon
the defendant-licensor.
The paucity of instances where the reasonableness of the royalty
requested by the licensor has been litigated may be thought to reflect
upon the value of the rather elaborate reasonable royalty provision
found in antitrust judgments. 32 Yet their very presence may have
a deterrent effect upon a licensor who would like to get what the
33
traffic could bear.
Know-how or technical information in the use of patented inventions
or without such connection has been required to be made generally
available by defendants. 34
Impact on Business DealingsOutside
of Patents
Even without the presence of patents, antitrust judgments have
prohibited or severely limited organizations from refusing to supply
goods or services to those desiring them.35 Antitrust judgments often
30. Id. at 71.
31. United States v. American Optical Co., 1948-49 Trade Cas. if 62308
(S.D.N.Y. 1948).
32. Since litigation is costly, the fact that the licensee rather than the government must wield a laboring oar, may to some extent account for the lack
of litigation of this issue.
33. In practice, if there were a going rate before entry of the judgment that
rate is likely to persist. Complaints to the government of unreasonableness of
a royalty rate have been uncommon.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Western Electric Co., 1956 Trade Cas. gf 68246
(D.N.J. 1956); United States v. Technicolor, Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. 1 62586
(S.D. Cal. 1950) (judgment against Technicolor); United States v. Technicolor, Inc., 4 D. & J. 3246, 1948-49 Trade Cas. if 62388 (S.D. Cal. 1948) (judgment against Kodak); United States v. Western Precipitation Corp., 4 D. & J.
3038, 1946-47 Trade Cas. ff 57458 (S.D. Cal. 1946) (written information to be
deposited in certain libraries).
35. United States v. Torrington Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1957 Trade Cas.)
ff 68611 (D. Conn. 1957); United States v. Technicolor, Inc., 1950-51 Trade
Cas. if 62586 (S.D. Cal. 1950); United States v. Textile Machine Works, 1950-51
Trade Cas. if 62709 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v. American Society of
Composers, 1950-51 Trade Cas. f1 62595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v.
International Nickel Co., 4 D. & J. 3086, 1948-49 Trade Cas. if 62280 (S.D.N.Y.
1948); United Statei v. Associated Press, 3 D. & 3. 2658, 52 F. Supp. 362
(S.D.N.Y. 1944); United States v. Pullman Co., 3 D. & J. 2164, 1944-45 Trade
Cas. ff 57242 (E.D. Pa. 1944); United States v. Mosaic Tile Co., 3 D. & J. 2128,
1940-43 Trade Cas. if 56051 (N.D. Ill. 1940); United States v. Greater N. Y.
Live Poultry C. of C., 2 D. & J. 1443 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); United States v. New
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forbid or sharply curtail discrimination by a business enterprise.3 6
Businesses operating on a delivered pricing system have been
required to give purchasers the option of buying f.o.b. the point of
production.37 On occasion, suppliers have also been forced to deal with
buyers on the basis of the requirements of a single facility rather than
with respect to the requirements of all the facilities of a buyer; 38
and buyers have been forced to deal with suppliers on an individual
39
facility basis.
While it is a common business practice to limit a distributor to a
particular geographical area, a number of antitrust judgments have
prohibited this practice. 40 Not infrequently, antitrust judgments pro41
hibit or restrict exclusive dealings.
England Fish Exchange, 1 D. & J. 860 (D. Mass. 1919); United States v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 1 D. & J. 554 (D. Ore. 1914); United

States v. Aluminum Co., 1 D. & J. 395 (W.D. Pa. 1912).
In the later Aluminum case, an amendment to the judgment required the
Aluminum Import Corporation, a subsidiary of Aluminum, Ltd.-a Canadian
company-to make available for five years to nonintegrated buyers in the
United States not less than 110,000 short tons of primary aluminum pig or
ingot; and Alcoa was required to offer Olin Industries, Inc. specif'c amounts
of primary aluminum pig or ingot, for a period of years. United States v.
Aluminum Co., 1954 Trade Cas.
67745 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
36. United States v. Greyhound Corp., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1957 Trade
Cas.) 1[ 68756 (N.D. Ill. 1957); United States v. Shubert, 1956 Trade Cas. 1
68272 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. American Can Co., 1950-51 Trade
Cas. ir 62679 (N.D. Cal. 1950); United States v. Textile Machine Works, 195051 Trade Cas. ff 62709 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 2 D. & J. 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); United States v. Barbers' Supply Dealers Ass'n, 2 D. & J. 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1920); United States v. Great Lakes
Towing Co., 1 D. & J. 260 (N.D. Ohio 1915).
37. United States v. American Can Co., supra note 36; United States v.
Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 3 D. & J. 2374, 1940-43 Trade Cas. ff 56133
(S.D.N.Y. 1941); United States v. Sugar Institute, Inc., 2 D. & J. 1518, 1932-39
Trade Cas. ff 55107 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). In referring to the judgment in the
Stainless Steel case, which gave the buyer the option of buying f.o.b. mill
or at a delivered price no greater than the mill price plus the actual cost of
delivery, the head of the Antitrust Division, in explaining the division's policies in 1949, noted that this provision was inserted not in a belief that a
delivered price system was illegal, but because it was thought to be the
only way the unlawful effects of the price fixing conspiracy could be dissipated.
38. E.g., United States v. American Can Co., 1950-51 Trade Cas. f1 62679
(N.D. Cal. 1950).
39. E.g., United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 1949 Trade Cas. II
62447 (W.D.N.Y. 1949).

ir

40. E.g., United States v. J. P. Seeburg Corp., CCH

TRADE REG. REP.

(1957

Trade Cas.) ff 68613 (N.D. Ill. 1957); United States v. Bendix Home Appliances,

Inc., 4 D. & J. 3197, 1948-49 Trade Cas. ff 62346 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
41. United States v. International Boxing Club, Civil No. 74-81, S.D.N.Y.
(1957); United States v. Western Electric Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 68246 (D.N.J.
1956); United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 1954 Trade Cas. I[ 67828 (D.R.I.
1954); United States v. Association of American Battery Manufacturers, 1952-53
Trade Cas. ff 67631 (W.D. Mo. 1953); United States v. American Can Co.,
1950-51 Trade Cas. ff 62679 (N.D. Cal. 1950) (requirement or supply contracts limited to one year); United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 4
D. & J. 2931, 1948-49 Trade Cas. ff 62323 (N.D. Ohio 1948); United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 4 D. & J. 3210, 1948-49 Trade Cas. II 62261 (S.D. Cal. 1948);
United States v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 2 D. & J. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 19-);
United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 1 D. & J. 260 (N.D. Ohio 1915).
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On the other hand, some judgments have prohibited a company
from engaging in certain types of business,4 or have limited the
amount of business which could be done by it. 43 A related type of
44
restriction is a limitation on the number of distribution outlets. Provisions prohibiting the use of a common purchasing agent have had an
early genesis, 45 and a number of companies have been forbidden to act

as sales agents for other companies. 46
In one judgment, defendants were required, over a period of years,
to increase the average number of establishments to which they delivered plate or sheet glass. 47 One defendant who, among other things,
had protested too much, was required to abandon protests to common
carriers allowing others diversion privileges.48
In some instances, companies have been required to dedicate their
trademarks to the public, 49 or have had their rights in trademarks
curtailed, with a corresponding increase in their availability to others
or a corresponding diminution of their importance.5 0
Antitrust judgments often require individuals as well as corporaIn United States v. Greyhound Corp., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1957 Trade
Cas.) 1 68756 (N.D. Ill. 1957), the judgment prohibited the defendant from
contracting to buy all its bus requirements from one source.
42. United States v. Western Electric Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 1 68246 (D.N.J.

1956); United States v. Seafarers Sea Chest Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. ff 68298
(E.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. A. B. Dick Co., 4 D. & J. 3121, 1948-49
Trade Cas. 1162233 (N.D. Ohio 1948); United States v. Pullman Co., 3 D. & J.
2164, 1940-43 Trade Cas. 1156301 (E.D. Pa. 1940); United States v. Swift and
Co., 2 D. & J. 962 (D.D.C. 1920). In the last-mentioned case, Swift was forbidden to sell specified grocery products, and to have retail meat markets.
At the time of this writing, there is pending an application by Swift to be
relieved of this prohibition. Also see page .... infra.
43. United States v. International Boxing Club, Civil No. 74-81, S.D.N.Y.
1957; United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 1948-49 Trade Cas. 11
62447 (W.D.N.Y. 1949); United States v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 3
D. & J. 2374, 1940-43 Trade Cas. 1156133 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). In United States v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 1954 Trade Cas. 1167920 (W.D.N.Y. 1954), the judgment
provided for divestiture of so much of its facilities as, seven years later, would
be in excess of 50% of domestic capacity for processing Eastman color film.
44. E.g., United States v. American Optical Co., 3 D. & J. 2205, 1948-49
Trade Cas. f1 62308 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
45. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 1 D. & J. 163, 188-89, 191 Fed.
371, 429-30 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
46. E.g., United States v. General Paper Co., 1 D. & J. 75 (D. Minn. 1906).
Cf. United States v. Diamond Match Co., 4 D. & J. 2833, 1946-47 Trade Cas. 11
57456 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (prohibition against acting as exclusive agent or being
exclusive purchaser or distributor). A somewhat similar interdiction is found
in United States v. General Electric Co., 3 D. & J. 2282, 1946-47 Trade Cas.
f157448 (D.N.J. 1946).
47. United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 4 D. & J. 2931, 1948-49
Trade Cas. ff 62323 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
48. United States v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd., 4 D. & J. 2865, 1944-45 Trade
Cas. f157410 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
49. United States v. A. B. Dick Co., 4 D. & J. 3121, 1948-49 Trade Cas.
1162233 (N.D. Ohio 1948); United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 1954
Trade Cas. f1 67828 (D.R.I. 1954).
50. United States v. Gamewell Co., 3 D. & J. 3175, 1948-49 Trade Cas. f1
62236 (D. Mass. 1948); United States v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 4 D. & J.

2916, 1946-47 Trade Cas. f157645 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
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tions to dispose of stock holdings, and such provisions are at times
quite complex. 51 A judgment against the Greyhound Corporation prohibited it from purchasing commodities from any person known to it
to own more than three percent of Greyhound stock. 52
Some businessmen and their corporations have regarded state fair
trade laws and the Miller-Tydings Act 53 as providing them with a
charter of freedom to fix the price at the retail level of a commodity.
54
Even that "freedom" may be curtailed by an antitrust judgment.
A 1911 lamp consent judgment against General Electric Company
caused it in 1954 great concern because it could be construed to bar
resale price maintenance agreements. Within the company's ranks,
the belief that it was a bar was sufficiently persuasive for it to seekand obtain-from the Department of Justice consent to the removal
of this prohibition. While a reservation of rights under the WebbPomerene Act 55 is found not infrequently in antitrust judgments, a
few judgments have been entered expressly taking away benefits of
56
that act.
Judgments prohibiting the acquisition of an interest in other companies engaged in the same or associated business, or the acquisition
of additional facilities without prior court approval and notice to the
Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division, are common, sometimes as a complement to divestiture provisions, sometimes as a substitute therefor. In practice,
it is rare for a defendant merely to file an application to the court and
notify the Department of Justice. For the most part, the defendant's
representatives will first sound out the feeling within the department
on the proposed acquisition, and more often than not will qualify or
abandon the proposal if there is serious objection. The application to
51. Thus, in the Aluminum case, there was a separate judgment on stock
disposal of 27 printed pages. This judgment provided for the appointment of
a trustee. United States v. Aluminum Co., Judgment on Stock Disposal,

Eq. No. 85-731, S.D.N.Y., Jan. 16, 1951.
52. United States v. Greyhound Corp., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1957 Trade

Cas.) f[ 68756 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
53. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
54. United States v. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n, CCH Trade REG. REP.
(1957 Trade Cas.) 'f 68751 (E.D. Tenn. 1957); United States v. United Liquors
Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. f1 68,459 (W.D. Tenn. 1956); United States v. American
Optical Co., 3 D. & J. 2205, 1949-49 Trade Cas. f[ 62308 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United
States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 4 D. & J. 2931, 1948-49 Trade Cas.
f162323 (N.D. Ohio 1948); United States v. Diamond Match Co., 4 D. & J. 2833,
1946-47 Trade Cas. f[ 57456 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); United States v. Bausch & Lomb
Co., 3 D. & J. 2241, 45 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), modified and affd, 321
U.S. 707 (1944); United States v. Ideal Cement Co., 3 D. & J. 2524, 1940-43
Trade Cas. 'f 56199 (D. Colo. 1942).
55. 40 STAT. 516 (1918), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1952).
56. United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 4 D. & J. 2931, 194849 Trade Cas. f1 62323 (N.D. Ohio 1948); United States v. Diamond Match
Co., 4 D. & J. 2833, 1946-47 Trade Cas. f1 57456 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
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the court will normally follow, rather than precede, negotiations with
members of the Antitrust Division.
While it is not uncommon to find companies maintaining excess
capacity to deter competition, in some instances where they have run
afoul of the antitrust laws this business practice has been denied them
57
or has been severely restricted.
Judgments have been framed in some cases to induce defendants to
compete. Thus, a defendant has been required to promote an export
business.
In an endeavor to discourage price uniformity, some judgments
require a defendant to review its prices and "to determine prices...
based on its own manufacturing and overhead costs, the margin of
profit individually desired and other lawful considerations. '59
Regulation and record-keeping go hand in hand, yet only in a few
instances do antitrust judgments expressly provide that records be
kept.60 However, the right of government attorneys to examine the
records of a defendant in connection with the judgment is uniformly
provided for, and almost always is accompanied by an obligation of a
defendant to furnish relevant reports upon request of the Department
61
of Justice.
We may close this part of the article by noting that at least one
antitrust judgment took notice of the ubiquitous improvident or un62
fortunate automobile buyer.
GLASS COwTAmnERS-THE HARTFORD-EmPIE

JUDGMENT

For many years prior to 1940, the glass container industry had been
strictly regimented through a series of restrictive patent license agreements covering the automatic machinery necessary to make glass
57. E.g., United States v. Solvay Process Co., 3 D. & J. 2607, 1944-45 Trade
Cas. f[57229 (D. Kan. 1944).
58. United States v. United States Rubber Co., 1954 Trade Cas.
67771
(S.D.N.Y. 1954). Among other things, this judgment required the United
States Rubber Company to designate and adopt additional trademarks for
use in exports distinct from certain specified ones.
59. United States v. Gold Fillers Manufacturers Ass'n, CCH TRADE REG. REP.
(1957 Trade Cas.) II 68760 (D. Mass. 1957). See also United States v. L. A.
Young Spring and Wire Corp., 1950-51 Trade Cas. 1 62908 (E.D. Mich. 1951),

after a decline of four consecutive months in the monthly wholesale price
index of the 1954 Bureau of Labor Statistics.
60. See, e.g., Wallace & Tiernan Co., 1954 Trade Cas. ff 67828 (D.R.I. 1954)
(to keep complete and intact for 10 years orderly, classified records). See also
United States v. Gamewell Co., 4 D. & J. 3175, 1948-49 Trade Cas. ff 62236
(D. Mass. 1948).

61. See. e.g., United States v. General Electric Co., 1954 Trade Cas. ff

67714 at 69301 (D.N.J. 1954).
62. United States v. Chrysler Corp., 2 D. & J.1729 (N.D. Ind. 1938) (no assignment of wages or garnishment with respect to automobiles sold for less
than $1,000 for private use unless the buyer was requested to return auto-

mobile and did not do so).
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bottles. Restrictions ran the gamut from type of glass container which
could be made, to the number of glass containers which could be
produced. Only a few major glass container companies were wholly
or substantially free from such restrictions, and this freedom was the
result of their conspiracy with Hartford-Empire Corporation. Almost
all the automatic machinery used to make glass containers was made
at the instance of Hartford-Empire, a patent holding company which
licensed the machines to glass container manufacturers. 63
The dominant members of the industry were well satisfied with the
above state of affairs. While there were a number of smaller glass
making companies which desired to throw off this restrictive yoke,
there were others which were content to be restricted as long as they
knew that others were also restricted, and that because of HartfordEmpire's patent control, newcomers would find it impossible or very
difficult to enter the industry.
Into this monopoly picture came the spotlight of TNEC hearings,
to be followed by a government antitrust suit.64 The defendants were
Hartford-Empire Corporation, Corning Glass Works, Owens-Illinois
Glass Company, Hazel-Atlas Glass Company, Thatcher Manufacturing Company, Ball Brothers Company, Lynch Corporation, Glass
Container Association of America, and a considerable number of
individual defendants.
In 1942, the trial court entered a complex judgment against all defendants except some of the individuals. 5 This judgment ran to fortyseven mimeographed pages. A keystone of the decree was a provision
for royalty-free licensing. Against this judgment, the defendants
brought a heavy artillery of objections. The Supreme Court struck
the royalty-free licensing provision and used a mattox on a number
of other paragraphs of the judgment. 66
The case went back to the trial court for further proceedings. An
abortive proceeding was had before a master to ascertain "reasonable
royalties. ' 67 Patent expert vied with patent expert. Questions of
validity and scope found government attorneys without any experience upon which to draw.
All the parties were weary of the extensive litigation and made
earnest efforts to agree upon a judgment which could be offered to the
court by both sides. Into this situation appeared an extraordinary
63. Owens-Illinois Glass Company used some of its own machines as well
as those of Hartford-Empire.
64. For a record of the proceedings see United States v. Hartford-Empire
Co., 46 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ohio 1942).
65. Ibid.
66. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, clarified, 324

U.S. 570 (1945).
67. United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 65 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Ohio 1946).
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body known as the Committee of Hartford-Empire Licensees. Composed of almost all of the rest of the glass container industry which
were not defendants, its representatives played an active part in the
negotiations which led to the judgment presented to and entered by
the trial court in May 1947. This judgment comprised one hundred
eighty-nine printed pages, fifty-eight of which were text. The rest consisted of a settlement agreement-the parties to which were HartfordEmpire, the Committee of Hartford-Empire Licensees, the Department
68
of Justice; forms; and explanatory material.
The judgment required the defendants to license and lease and to
sell glass making machines. The judgment prohibited the repossession
of leased machinery prior to the expiration of the lease except upon
thirty days' notice to the Attorney General.
A number of provisions of the decree attempted to furnish definitive
guides for determining a reasonable price on the sale of the machinery,
as well as for single paid up royalties. The judgment gave an applicant
the right to apply for a license under such patents as he desired and
not merely under a package of patents. It expunged from the licenses
and leases of machines restrictive provisions and prohibited their imposition upon users of the machines. ,
Under the judgment, for a period of ten years almost all types of
future agreements 69 between the corporate defendants had to be filed
with the Attorney General at least fifteen days before they could be
entered into, and if objected to, a defendant could not become a party
thereto without prior court approval.7 0
The judgment prohibited the corporate defendants from acquiring
any measure of control over any competing firm unless with the approval of the court, after notice to the Attorney General.
The corporate defendants were enjoined from being members of
a trade association for the glass container industry similar to the one
which had been dissolved as a result of the suit.
Ball Brothers was required to offer for sale a plant at Three Rivers
in Texas. The judgment also required Lynch Corporation to offer for
sale certain assets it had acquired from another company.
Not only the judgment, but also the sensitivity of some of the defendants to the shadow of the Department of Justice over the industry
-or over them-caused many troublesome problems to come to the
Department's attention after the judgment. Hartford-Empire and
68. United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 1946-47 Trade Cas. ff 57571 (N.D.

Ohio 1947).

69. Those relating to patents, trade practices, volume or methods of production, or trade relations and to the subject matter of the judgment.
70. Excepted were agreements identical, except as to parties, dates, number
and types of machinery, with agreements filed prior thereto with the Attorney
General.
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Owens-Illinois, perhaps the prime offenders prior to the judgment,
were particularly concerned with how the Antitrust Division would
regard their activities in the future.
An early problem, never satisfactorily resolved as contemplated by
the judgment, was the disposition by Owens of assets of the Kimble
Glass Company at the latter's Chicago Heights plant. Owens, which
had acquired Kimble, was obligated to offer the assets for sale for a
three-year period. A court-appointed appraiser, who had been agreed
upon beforehand by counsel for Owens and counsel for the government, made an appraisal of the property which government attorneys
felt was out of line as too high to induce a newcomer to come into the
glass container industry through the medium of such purchase. Questions arose as to whether improvements made by Owens had to be paid
for, and whether a would-be purchaser would have an opportunity to
buy the improvements. Conferences were had on such matters as depreciation schedules. There were several inquiries by prospective
purchasers, but none was willing to pay the appraised value. No glass
company ever did purchase the assets.
After the Glass Container Association was dissolved, a number of
the smaller glass companies thought they needed an association. They
also felt such an association had to be able to have some contacts with
the larger companies who were subject to the Hartford-Empire judgment. Conferences with representatives of the government led to
several modifications in the original proposals for such association, but
also led to the creation of a Glass Container Institute. At the government's insistence, an appreciable time interval was required between
the time of the receipt of statistical information by the Institute from
its members and the issuance of compilations of such information by
the Institute. This question of time interval was the subject of discussion on several subsequent occasions in 1948 and 1949 between representatives of the Antitrust Division and the Institute. In February,
1949, an amendment reduced the time lag from two months to twenty
days.
Questions arose as to whether certain patents acquired by a defendant after the judgment came within the definitions in the judgment.
In 1948, Hartford-Empire raised with the Antitrust Division the
matter of reclaiming machinery in possession of a trustee of a glass
company which was in receivership. The matter was agreeably resolved by the court's granting the trustee additional retention time
under an agreement with Hartford-Empire; the latter agreed to notify
the Department of Justice before asserting rights in the machinery.
This act of benevolence, however, did not save the life of the company.
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New royalty charges proposed by Hartford met with no opposition
and received court approval in February, 1948. In April, 1948, with the
consent of the Department of-Justice, -the court-entered an order with
respect to engineering serviee charges by Hartford-Empire.
In 1948, Ball Brothers took up with the Department of Justice their
contemplated leasing of the Chattanooga Glass Company plant in
Jacksonville, Florida. The Department contacted a substantial number
of other glass companies to ascertain whether they would be interested
in the plant and if not, what competitive effect they thought Ball's
acquisition would have. The responses varied from indifference-the
majority-to mild opposition. In October, 1948, Ball Brothers was
permitted by the court to lease the plant in Jacksonville.
In December, 1949, Hartford-Empire gave notice of its intention to
change the royalty rates with respect to the licensing of its class 81
feeder, "a future type machine." It desired to fix the same rates as it
had with respect to previous types of feeders, but to make the rate
applicable to all types of glassware made on the new feeder. This
change would affect principally fruit jar manufacturers. The rates
would apply to stoppers, caps, lids, and/or liners, bulbs and balls and
marbles. Prior thereto, no royalties had been charged as to the first
four, and different royalties as to the last three.
Government attorneys wrote to a number of glassware companies
asking if they had any objections or comments to make with respect
to Hartford-Empire's proposal. No one objected.
In 1950, Corning Glass Works wanted to acquire the assets of
Anchor-Hocking Company. The Department of Justice refused to approve such acquisition and opposed it. The acquisition was not made.
In 1948, pursuant to the judgment, Hartford-Empire filed with the
Department of Justice a draft of a proposed agreement with respect
to Owens' M lehr loader, and another proposed agreement with OwensIllinois involving an Owens automatic decorating machine.71 These
proposed agreements were the subject of many conferences between
representatives of the two companies and representatives of the Antitrust Division. The Division sent out letters to glassware machinery
manufacturers inquiring whether others besides Hartford-Empire desired to receive from Owens-Illinois, at a price, drawing, etc. of the
lehr loader. A number of companies expressed an interest. Contact
with Owens-Illinois was arranged, but none entered into an agreement
with Owens.
Proposed acquisitions by defendants in the case caused the Department of Justice no less involvement and trouble than required dis71. It is of interest to note that out of an abundance of caution, agreements
were sent to the Department of Justice even when thought by the defendants
not to come within the judgment.
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positions of property by the defendants. Owens-Illinois' proposed acquisition of Sharpe, Inc. posed a by no means clear-cut problem of
whether the acquisition was covered by the judgment.
In 1950, Hartford-Empire proposed ten modifications of the decree.
One dealt with the price at which Hartford-Empire was to sell its
machines. Some of the other changes proposed were major, some were
minor. The Department of Justice thought it should get the views of
the licensees before reaching a decision as to what position to take on
the application. From at least one licensee there was strong objection.
The Committee of Hartford-Empire Licensees, which was still in existence, also voted to disapprove and object to the company's application. Several conferences later, agreement was reached with HartfordEmpire, and a much watered-down amendment was approved by the
court.
In 1951, two of the defendant companies were allowed to become
members of the Glass Container Manufacturer's Institute.
In November of 1951, Thatcher Glass Manufacturing Company was
permitted to acquire the McKee Glass Company, without objection
from the Department of Justice.
In 1952, Hartford-Empire gave notice of additional charges for its
I. S. machine paste mold attachment. Its application to the court contained the statement that, "The license fee and royalty referred to
herein have been submitted to and approved by the Committee of
Hartford-Empire Licensees."
In 1953, Owens-Illinois proposed to acquire the Plax Corporation for
$9,000,000. Over the government's objection, the court held that the
judgment did not prohibit the acquisition.
By 1954, no one had evidenced a serious interest in acquiring Ball
Brothers' plant in Three Rivers, Texas. In that year, this defendant
applied to the court for permission to sell its plant to someone for
scrap and real estate purposes. The Department initially objected to
this application, but subsequently withdrew its objection. Approval
was given by the court.
In 1954, Hartford-Empire gave notice of a change in charges for
servicing and with respect to license fees for feeders and for its 128 machine. In the absence of protest from the licensees and the Department
of Justice, these changes were allowed by the court. That year, there
was also an unobjected-to amendment to the judgment with respect
to the term of Hartford-Empire's stacker licenses and leases.
In the same year, on notice to the Department of Justice, HartfordEmpire wrote to the Committee of Hartford-Empire Licensees asking
the Committee to meet and consider a proposal to ask the court's approval to establish a fee for certain new machines and to change the
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fee for certain other machines. Approval by the court followed approval by the Committee.
The long-lived Committee of Hartford-Empire Licensees as late as
December, 1955, was meeting with Hartford-Empire, in Miami, discussing research on an industry-wide basis7 2
Prior to the judgment, Hartford-Empire had never sold, but only
leased and licensed, its machines. By 1949, it could be said with respect
to the option in the judgment to buy or lease, that the greater majority
of feeders had been purchased outright, while most of the other machinery continued to be leased. As of March 1950, eighty percent of
the feeders had been sold, forty to fifty percent of the I. S. formers,
and practically no lehrs.
Another marked effect of the judgment was the entry of AnchorHocking Glass Corporation, Knox Glass Bottle Company, and the
Brockway Company into the manufacture of fruit jars, which prior
to the suit had not been available to them.
While not customary, the extent of the government's participation
in the glass container business as the result of the Hartford-Empire
judgment was not unique, but the presence and the activities of the
Committee of Hartford-Empire Licensees, which could be traced back
to the judgment, has no precedent so far as this writer knows.
MOTION PICTURES-THE PARAMOUNT CASE
The wonderful land of make-believe, sometimes known as motion
pictures, has had a history of antitrust litigation unmatched by any
other industry. Most of such suits, it has taken as a matter of course.
Not so, the antitrust action brought by the federal government in
73
1938. Not until 1945 did this case, known as the Paramount case,
come to trial. Defendants were the eight leading motion picture companies: Columbia, Fox, Loew's, Inc.-often called Metro-Paramount,
RKO, United Artists, Universal, and Warner Brothers. Five of these
companies not only produced and distributed motion pictures, but
also had large chains of motion picture theatres.
The primary relief sought by the government was the separation of
the exhibition interests from the production and distribution side of
the integrated companies, and divestiture of theatres in localities
where competition was absent or insubstantial. The case was tried
before a special three-judge court.
The court found a violation of the Sherman Act on the part of all
72. By this time, Hartford-Empire had itself become part of Emhart Company. This made little difference in the enforcement of the judgment.
73. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1946-47 Trade Cas. 1 57526
(S.D.N.Y. 1946).
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the defendants. Typically, it received proposed judgments from the
parties. Atypically, the key provision in the judgment entered by it
on December 31, 1946, was a creation of its own concoction. This provision established an, elaborate system of licensing feature films
through competitive bidding.7 4 No divorcement or divestiture was
required except with respect to pooling agreements and joint interest
pertaining to motion picture theatres. It had other provisions of varying strength and ran to thirteen mimeographed pages.
To the pained astonishment of the court, the chorus of condemnation
for its competitive bidding provision extended even beyond the defendants, although here and there it had a friend-the government
was not one such and felt keenly that the judgment was inadequate.
All parties appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court handed down
a decision which disapproved certain parts of the judgment, including
the competitive bidding provision.75 It suggested that the trial court
reconsider its approach to the problem of entering an adequate judgment, but did not tell that court what kind of judgment it should
enter.
By the time the case went back to the trial court in 1948, its youngest
member had died. His replacement made the court a tribunal of oldsters, none of whom was under seventy. It was still headed by the
redoubtable, but sharp-tongued, Augustus Hand.
While both sides were preparing for further proceedings before the
trial court, RKO began negotiations for a consent judgment, prodded
by its controlling stockholder, Howard R. Hughes, a controversial figure on the American business scene.
A consent judgment was entered against RKO on November 8,
1948.76 It ran to 22 printed pages. It was the mildest of any of the
judgments to be entered in the case, but at the time it was difficult to
prophesy what kind of judgment the court might fashion without
the consent of the parties. Like the original judgment, it forbade minimum admission price fixing and the imposition of unreasonable clearance between theatres (time interval between runs of pictures). As to
the latter, in case of dispute, a burden of justification was placed upon
the distributor.
78
Prohibitions against "formula deals" 77 and "master agreements"
74. Id. at 58399.
75. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
76. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1948-49 Trade Cas. 1 62335
(S.D.N.Y. 1948).
77. The term "formula deal" means a licensing agreement with a circuit of
theatres in which the license fee of a given feature is measured for the
theatres covered by the agreement by a special percentage of the feature's
national gross.
78. The term "master agreement" means a licensing agreement, also known
as a "blanket deal," covering the exhibition of features in a number of
theatres usually comprising a circuit.
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were identical with those in the original judgment, as were prohibitions against licenses in which the right to exhibit one feature was
conditioned upon the licensee's taking other features. Where the
license covered more than one feature which had not been preshown to the trade prior to the license, the judgment required that
the licensee have the right to reject twenty percent of such features.
A prohibition against long-term franchise agreements with exhibitors was similar to that of the former judgment except for the addition
of a provision required by the decision of the Supreme Court, namely,
an exception to enable independent theatres to operate a theatre in
competition with a theatre affiliated with a defendant.
The judgment contained prohibitions like those of the former judgment against pooling agreements and joint theatre interests, but without the trial court's implementation provisions. The judgment permitted one defendant to acquire the joint interest of another defendant upon application to the court if the latter found the acquisition
would not unduly restrain competition in the exhibition of feature
motion pictures. The original judgment had extended this privilege to
joint interests of independent theatre owners.
Like the original judgment, acting through a common agent was
prohibited. The judgment prohibited future theatre acquisitions unless
the court found the acquisition would not unduly restrain competition
in the exhibition of feature motion pictures. This was a substitution
for a prohibition against extension of its present theatre holdings.
Joint interests in some two hundred eighty designated theatres had
to be severed. RKO was permitted to acquire the full interest in thirty
of such theatres, but only four of which could be in New York City.
The only wholly-owned theatres RKO was required to dispose of were
two first run theatres in Cincinnati, Ohio.
The judgment provided for a New Theatre Company and a New Picture Company, to be wholly independent of one another after a year
from the date of the judgment. Nothing in the judgment was to limit
RKO, during the year or prior to reorganization to favor its own
theatres with RKO pictures. Howard Hughes, in recognition of the
problem of his holding twenty-four percent of the stock in RKO, expressly consented to dispose of his stock in either the New Picture
Company or the New Theatre Company within a year, or trustee his
stock until it was sold.
The entry of RKO's judgment did not halt the efforts of all the
other parties to have the trial court enter a judgment most favorable
to each of them, but it was undoubtedly a cause for Paramount to
institute negotiations for a consent judgment. Paramount's theatre
interests extended to almost 1500, many of which they held together
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with large local circuit partners. The consent judgment entered against
Paramount on March 3, 1949, comprised seventy-eight printed pages,
not including a separate agreement of several pages, filed at the same
9
time and treated as part of the judgment.7
In addition to the trade practice provisions in the RKO judgment,
the Paramount decree contained a paragraph which was to become
the key unifying provision in all the motion picture judgments. This
paragraph 8 prohibited Paramount, "From licensing any feature for
exhibition upon any run in any theatre in any other manner than
that each license shall be offered and taken theatre by theatre, solely
upon the merits and without discrimination in favor of affiliated
theatres, circuit theatres or others."80 This paragraph was an amalgamation of two provisions in the initial judgment of 1946.
The Paramount judgment contained elaborate provisions for severance of joint interests, with varying timetables, the maximum of which
was three years. Paramount was also required to dispose of one or
more theatres, as specified, in numerous designated cities, but only in
a very few instances were the theatres designated by name. Up to
twelve of such theatres could be leased or sub-leased if a sale on
reasonable terms could not be made. In a few cities, Paramount had
the choice of limiting itself to one first run theatre.
The judgment greatly limited Paramount's acquisition of theatre
interests during the time it was to make the required disposition of
theatres under the decree. The judgment provided for a New Picture and a New Theatre Company to be independent of one another.
It had elaborate provisions for the trusteeing of the stock of the New
Theatre Company. Stockholders were to get certificates of interest
and to be paid fifty per cent of the dividends, but if fifty-one per cent
of the shares of stock were not released by the trustee to nonholders
of stock of the New Picture Company within two years, he was to
withhold one hundred per cent of the dividends. Provision for termination of the trust upon a reduction to one-third of the stock in the
hands of the trustee was provided for.
As the result of the trial court's opinion in July 1949, 81 both sides
again submitted proposed judgments to it. The judgments entered
against Columbia, United Artists, and Universal contained trade practice provisions similar to those in the Paramount judgment. Those
against Fox, Loew's, Inc., and Warner required the submission of
plans of divorcement and divestiture.0 2 The latter three defendants
79. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1948-49 Trade Cas. ff 62377

(S.D.N.Y. 1949).

80. Id. at 63011.

81. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1948-49 Trade Cas.

(S.D.N.Y. 1949).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas.
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).

62473
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appealed to the Supreme Court, as did the government. But, by
the time of the affirmance of the lower court's judgment in June of
1950,83 consent judgments with respect to specific joint interests and
pooling agreements had been entered, and Warner was in the process
of negotiating a consent judgment with one eye windward toward the
Supreme Court.
After more than a year of negotiations, judgments were entered
against Warner, 84 Fox,85 and Loew's. 8 6 The major additional provisions in the judgments against these three defendants were (1)
the "sword of Damocles" provision which, in some instances provided
for a defendant to be limited in its right to license pictures for its
theatres, if a competitor was denied a reasonable opportunity to acquire pictures from the major distributors; and in some other instances
provided for an automatic requirement to dispose of additional
theatres or take a product limitation if, by a certain time, inadequate
competition existed; and (2) a prohibition against the New Picture
Company entering into the exhibition business and against the New
Theatre Company entering into distribution of pictures without consent of the court.
The judgments entered in these cases ran over four hundred pages.
They had a direct effect on competition in several hundred cities and
towns, and a substantial indirect effect wherever motion pictures
were shown.
The problems that arose in connection with these judgments were,
in the annals of the Antitrust Division, unique in number and complexity. This article can touch upon only a few. Since 1949, there has
been no time when the Division has not had several problems to
wrestle with which have stemmed from the judgments. About two
hundred sections of correspondence on the average of one and one-half
inches in thickness have been spawned from the judgments. For one
lengthy period, at least one-third of the entire correspondence of the
Antitrust Division was in the motion picture field. Amendments to
the judgments have exceeded the original judgments in size. In
number, they have been legion. While many of them have been with
respect to extensions of time, numerous ones have dealt with other
matters.
The industry was in the process of change induced by the growth
of television, drive-ins, and other innovations. Representatives of
the defendants have trod a well-beaten path to the offices of the
83. Loew's, Inc. v. United States, 339 U.S.
84. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1950-51
(consent judgment against Warner).
85. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1950-51
(consent judgment against Fox).
86. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1952-53
(consent judgment against Loew's).

974 (1950).
Trade Cas. ff 62765 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
Trade Cas. II 62861 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
Trade Cas. II 67228 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11

Antitrust Division, and by letter, telephone, telegraph, and in person,
exhibitors have sought the help of the Division with respect to enforcing the non-discriminating licensing provisions of the decree.
At an early date, Judge Hand, on behalf of the three-judge court,
indicated his distress at having to convene the court from time to time
to decide judgment problems. This attitude subsequently led to
the designation of a single judge to hear all matters arising out of the
Paramount judgment.
An early problem, born out of the Warner judgment, was whether
the landlord of the Warner Theatre on Broadway, who had had the
lease guaranteed by the parent corporation, could insist upon a
guaranty by both the New Picture and New Theatre companies. That
87
question was answered in the negative by the Supreme Court.
In arguing against an anti-discrimination provision, counsel for
Universal had asserted: ". . . discrimination could be claimed in
every connection-in connection with film rental, in connection with
runs, in connection with every form of contract and you would need
an Interstate Commerce Commission to administer any such injunction."
Since that time, many such claims have been made, but it has
been the exception rather than the rule for the Division to have any
real difficulty as to which claims deserved discussion with the distributor or distributors complained of. Decisions in such matters were
reached far sooner than in the case of matters submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Extensions of time to comply with the judgment were frequent.
Five years after the judgment against Loew's had been entered,
separation into a New Theatre and a New Picture Company-independent of one another-had not taken place. Said Judge Palmierie
in March of 1957, upon request by Loew's for a further extension:
"I am dismayed that so much time has already passed without
definite solutions and short of the accomplishment of total compliance
with the Consent Decree. But I do not wish to imply that more could
have been accomplished during the time that has passed since the
entry of the Consent Decree. Any conclusion in this regard must
necessarily await a thorough study of the problems which remain to
be solved."88
The court thereupon appointed a special consultant and two directors of the New Theatre Company. Actually, at the end of the
prescribed period, the government had refused to consent to a further
extension, and the court turned down a proposed order by Loew's
for separation.
87. Sutphen Estates v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951).
88. United States v. Loew's, Inc., Civil No. 57-286, S.D.N.Y., March, 1957.
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It may be noted that in the case of a number of defendants, after
initial extensions of time to dissolve joint theatre interests, subsequent extensions were consented to upon conditions designed to
discourage additional requests for extensions of time. In a number of
instances, the problems involved-either because of their magnitude
or because of change of circumstances-made it difficult for the Department of Justice to demand its pound of flesh. On the other hand,
the writer is convinced that in many instances, requests for extensions
of time were based upon a belief that it would be less profitable to
comply with the decree within the prescribed time than at a later
date. And, such extensions might well penalize the timely complying
defendant and give a premium to the more dilatory one who would
point to a change in conditions which had occurred after the decreed
time of compliance. On a few occasions, the Justice Department did
resist applications for extensions of time with partial success. One
such instance, engendering a major court battle, found minority stockholders of RKO, discontented with Howard Hughes' control of the
company, opposing RKO's application for a three-year extension to
split into two companies.
How changed conditions, a desire to effect greater relief, or the
possibility of achieving the result desired in a different way, could lead
to a modification which did not give carte. blanche to a defendant is
reflected in the following amendment to the Paramount judgment:
An order of April 17, 1952 re United Paramount Theatres, Inc. provided that if United Paramount did not acquire its co-owner's interest in either of two specified theatres in Springfield, Mass.,
it may acquire the interest of the co-owner or co-owners, in accordance
with the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of Section III A 9 of the
Consent Judgment, in two theatres in Springfield, Mass., provided, however, that in the event more than one theatre in Springfield in which
United Paramount has an interest plays first run, upon the request of
the Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division, United Paramount shall within 60 days of the request dispose of either the Broadway or Paramount Theatres, at its
option, if it has had an interest in the operation of Broadway when it
played first run. It shall also cease to play first run pictures at the
Broadway within thirty days after said request.89

Other provisions in this amendment also required United Paramount,
upon certain contingencies, to take steps to diminish its competitive
powers in Springfield upon the request of the government.
Applications by the defendants for permission to acquire theatres
have caused the Antitrust Division considerable work. It had been
89. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Civil No. 57-286, S.D.N.Y., April
17, 1952.
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the practice of the Division to contact nearby exhibitors to ascertain
how they feel toward the proposed acquisition and to notify them
that they could be heard in opposition at a court hearing if desired.
For a number of years, where there was no opposition, the government attorneys merely signed "Not objected to" at the foot of a
proposed order drafted by the interested defendant, and there was
no actual hearing. More recently, the government has preferred to
have all such applications heard by the court. On at least one occasion, when the Division did not object to a proposed acquisition, the
court was persuaded not to grant the application by arguments by
competing exhibitors. 90
A recurrent problem, which has been most troublesome to the Department of Justice, is whether, when a distributor releases an unusually popular picture and asks such high terms for it that to make
a profit the exhibitor must raise his normal admission prices, that is
minimum admission price fixing under the decree.
The split-up between the Skouras and RKO theatres in New York
City in 1949 did not take place until after litigation in the state courts
and the appointment of an appraiser.
The entry of the judgment against Paramount, with its stock provisions, evoked a chorus of angry letters from stockholders whose
consciences had not been bothered by receipt of monopoly profits, but
whose emotions erupted when forced to choose between the New
Picture Company and the New Theatre Company. Wrote one such
stockholder: "By swapping one corporation for two, you are greatly
increasing the cost of management. . . . Was it part of a plan to
socialize this country?" As a parting shot, he noted: "We no longer
live in the 19th century." As time passed, amendments were made
to the Paramount judgment so as to take shareholders of not over
five hundred shares of stock out of the terms of the trust.
Both in the case of RKO and Loew's, a major problem with respect
to splitting into two companies lay in their sizeable indebtedness to
financial institutions.
When Howard Hughes' stock in the New Theatre Company was
trusteed to a prominent New York City financial institution, the Department of Justice attorneys found themselves less than happy with
what they considered too much deference to the desires of Howard
Hughes, and too little concern with the terms and intent of the
trust. An attempt by the government to remove certain directors of
the New Theatre Company because of their direct or indirect connection with Hughes was only partially successful. An attempt by
the government to compel a sale of the stock was successful in the
90. See note 88 supra.
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lower court, but reversed in the Supreme Court. 91 The stock was
finally disposed of to third parties.
On several occasions, the question of whether a joint theatre owner
should not be considered an actual or potential exhibitor had to be
resolved by attorneys for the government. Such resolution was neither
always difficult nor always easy.
The matter of the disposition of RKO's stockholdings in Metropolitan Playhouses, Inc., and in Gifts, Inc. became a thorny point.
Brought before the court, the tribunal appointed a trustee to dispose
of the stock. The trust was to last no longer than two and a half
years. As far as the writer knows, the Metropolitan Playhouses, Inc.
stock has still not been disposed of, and the trust still obtains. Whether
the trustee and the government have been active enough on this
score is a matter of opinion.
With respect to one joint interest of Warner, involving a number of
theatres in New Jersey, a letter from the Department of Justice written in May of 1950 noted that, "We have now had ten or more conferences with you and the Amsterdams in connection with this matter." At least an equal number of conferences were had subsequently
before this matter was resolved. One amendment to the Warner judgment with respect to that same matter ran to nine pages.
In 1950, an important amendment to the Paramount judgment permitted United Paramount to sublease theatres as a method of disposition under stringent conditions as to when it could do so, as well
92
as to the terms which must be in the sublease.
In May of 1950, United Paramount sent the Antitrust Division an
agenda of ten important matters its representatives desired to discuss
with representatives of the division. The discussion that ensued
actually covered sixteen problems of importance.
Easily high up among the major amendments to any of the judgments was one which occurred in 1950. The Paramount judgment had
set a top limit to the number of theatres which could be retained by
Paramount. However, since the joint partners of Paramount had not
been made defendants in the suit, the judgment did not provide for
divestiture to third parties of theatres jointly held. The largest of
Paramount's partnership chain was known as the Interstate Circuit
which operated in many cities in Texas where it had complete or
partial monopoly of exhibition. It had been contemplated that the
partner would buy out United Paramount. United Paramount and
its partner had difficulty in reaching any agreement as to dissolution
of the joint interest. United Paramount then proposed that it be permitted to purchase its partner's interest and to make a general shift
91. Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952).
92. See note 89 supra.
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of its theatre interests so as not to have more than the prescribed
total. United Paramount was also willing to discuss with the division
what Interstate theatres it should sell to break up monopoly situations.
This proposal did not meet with unanimous approval within the
Antitrust Division, but the opportunity to open up many noncompetitive situations in Texas was too persuasive to resist. After
lengthy negotiations, an amendment to the Paramount judgment was
adopted which, with respect to the Interstate theatres, adopted many
of the provisions contained in the judgments entered after the one
against Paramount.
Certain officials in some of the defendant companies were found
to have theatre interests which the government felt were inconsistent
with the objectives of the judgments. Separate agreements were
entered into by such officials to eliminate such interests. Since, in
some instances, the value of the investment was considerable, some
of the agreements were complex. In one instance, disposal of common stock led the Division to take a more lenient view with respect
to problems involved in the disposition of preferred stock.
Some of the defendants were never willing to accede to the government's view that the theatres required to be disposed of had to be
sold or leased for motion picture purposes. There were some, but comparatively few, instances where this was not done. Judicial decision
on this question seems never to have been sought by the Division,
although with respect to Lakeland, Florida, the government successfully argued to the court that in order to have competition there,
United Paramount should divest itself of a large theatre rather than
the smaller one it proposed to sell.
A sale of Howard Hughes' stock in 1952, followed shortly by its return to him, caused a flurry of activity with respect to the trust agreement.
The merger of the American Broadcasting Company with United
Paramount necessitated an amendment to the voting trust provisions
of the Paramount judgment.
In 1953, the take-over by Fabian and Rosen, theatre operators, of
the Warner Theatre interests required much negotiation and an
order requiring disposal of certain theatres.
One of the more important matters brought to the attention of the
Department of Justice took place in 1953. This was the Cinerama deal.
Said the application to the court by the Fabian interests:
Your petitioner seeks an order of this court permitting your petitioner
to obtain and exploit a license under the patented so-called Cinerama
Process to distribute and exhibit, as well as produce, a new type of
motion picture, and to acquire for this purpose a limited number of
theatres. Such license and acquisitions are subject to stringent limitations
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and conditions prescribed by the Department of Justice and accepted
by your petitioner.

And later,
The Department took the position that it would only permit integra-

tion and exclusivity for a limited period, namely until December 31,
1958, in order to create an incentive upon the part of your petitioner

to commit its financial and manpower resources to develop this process,
that after December 31, 1958, your petitioner would be confined to ex-

hibition and after December 31, 1960, would be prohibited from distributing Cinerama pictures produced by it....

These were not the only limitations. In 1954, an amendment permitted RKO to sublease a theatre to its Stanley Warner Company in
Cincinnati to show Cinerama. A condition for consent as to the amendment was that RKO agree to sell another theatre in Cincinnati if
more than three of its theatres there played first run features.
Not the most important, but perhaps the most amusing, matter
arising out of the Paramount judgments occurred with respect to a
theatre in Brooklyn, New York, which Loew's judgment required to
be divested. Shortly after the judgment was entered, Loew's requested permission to sell the theatre to a Negro revivalist group,
which had been using the theatre for spiritual purposes. The Government took the position that it was intended that the theatre be
sold for motion picture purposes. A congressman from Brooklyn
then intervened to have the government consent to the proposed
sale. The Department held to its position. Counsel for Loew's then
requested an opportunity to come to Washington to confer concerning the matter. A date for the conference was set, to be held in the
office of the member of the Antitrust Division in charge of motion
picture matters. Came the day of the conference. At the appointed
time, the door of the office opened to disclose counsel for Loew's
with a delegation of people. The latter were members of the congregation. Hastily,: the conference was reconvened in the more spacious
quarters of the conference room. As the government's attorney
turned to counsel for Loew's to open the conference, one of the delegation held up his hand and said, "Let us pray." While counsel for
the government had thought they were accustomed to meet with all
kinds of opponents and arguments, they were not prepared to have
the Diety entered into the lists against them. We leave the reader
to wonder at the up-shot of this conference.
Conclusion
In sum, antitrust judgments contain a great number of "thou-shaltnots" for businessmen. Individually, they are tailored to the offenses
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charged and to the particular industry with which they are concerned.
And, no matter how regulatory antitrust judgments may be, it seems
generally true that the leaders of an industry, brought to the bar
under the antitrust laws, continue as leaders despite the judgment. To
them, this may justify their stout resistance to divorcement and
divestiture remedies. Yet, on the other hand, opportunity to compete
and the continued existence of competitors are often directly traceable
to a regulatory decree.
Many a judgment needs little policing. And, many a judgment gets
little policing because of lack of manpower or lack of funds. Where
the Antitrust Division does act to carry out a judgment, however, in
the writer's opinion, it acts with no less expertise, objectivity and
expedition than agencies established to regulate industry.

